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Much recent research on the Chinese economy has centred on analysing
changes in the personal distribution of income in China since 1978. The
purpose of this research has been both to delineate the trend in income
inequality over time, and to “decompose” this trend into its component
parts.1 The central conclusions to emerge are that income inequality has
increased sharply during the transition era, and that spatial factors –
particularly a rise in inter-provincial income differentials and an increase
in the urban–rural gap – have played a key role in the process. The policy
conclusion which has usually been drawn is that the Chinese state needs
to dismantle the remaining restrictions on labour mobility because these
have served to prevent the fruits of growth from “trickling down” from
urban areas and the eastern provinces to the Chinese hinterland. It is
argued that such a policy would raise rural wages and reduce urban
wages, thus reducing the urban–rural income gap. The removal of
obstacles to labour migration would also serve to reduce the income gap
between the coastal provinces and those of the interior.
The purpose of this report is to scrutinise the quality of the survey data
on which these conclusions are based. It will be argued that, even after
1. Some of the most important recent studies include Azizur Rahman Khan, Keith Griffin,
Carl Riskin and Zhao Renwei, “Household income and its distribution in China,” The China
Quarterly. No. 132 (December 1992); Keith Griffin and Zhao Renwei (eds.), The Distribution
of Income in China (London: Macmillan, 1993); Scott Rozelle, “Stagnation without equity,”
The China Journal, No. 35 (January 1996); World Bank, Sharing Rising Incomes
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1997); Li Shi, Zhao Renwei and Zhang Ping, “Zhongguo
jingji zhuanxing yu shouru fenpei biandong” (“China’s economic transition and changes in
the income distribution”), Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research), No. 4 (April 1998); Azizur
Rahman Khan and Carl Riskin, “Income and inequality in China,” The China Quarterly, No.
154 (June 1998); Lin Yifu, Cai Fang and Li Zhou, “Zhongguo jingji zhuanxing shiqi de diqu
chaju fenxi” (“An analysis of regional inequalities during China’s transition”), Jingji yanjiu
(Economic Research), No. 6 (June 1998): Hy Van Luong and Jonathan Unger, “Wealth, power
and poverty in the transition to market economies,” The China Journal, No. 40 (July 1998);
Tsui Kai-yuen, “Factor decomposition of Chinese rural income inequality,” Journal of
Comparative Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3 (September 1998); Li Shi and Zhao Renwei,
“Zhongguo jumin shouru fenpei zaiyanjiu” (“The Chinese income distribution revisited”),
Jingji yanjiu, No. 4 (April 1999); Dennis T. Yang, “Urban-biased policies and rising income
inequality in China,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings (May 1999);
Li Shi, Zhao Renwei and Carl Riskin (eds.), Zhongguo jumin shouru fenpei zaiyanjiu
(The Chinese Income Distribution Revisited) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe,
1999). Important early studies include E. B. Vermeer, “Income differentials in rural China.”
The China Quarterly, No. 89 (1982); Lee Travers, “Bias in Chinese economic statistics,”
The China Quarterly, No. 91 (1982) and Irma Adelman and David Sunding, “Economic
policy and income distribution in China,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 11, No.
3 (September 1987). This list takes no account of the large number of studies which have
looked at the distribution of per capita output using data on gross output value, net material
product and GDP.
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the adjustments to the State Statistical Bureau survey data made by (inter
alia) Khan, Zhao and Riskin, the data on China’s personal income
distribution still provide too fragile a basis for firm policy conclusions.
There is no question that income inequality has increased dramatically
since 1978, but both the extent of the increase and its underlying causes
are still very far from clear.
Changes in Chinese Income Distribution after 1978
The last State Statistical Bureau (SSB) survey of rural incomes prior to
the Cultural Revolution occurred in 1965 and covered 11,683 house-
holds.2 These households were required to keep a record of their income
and expenditure (and received a small payment in return). The survey
resumed in 1977, when it covered 3,646 households; the figure had risen
to 18,529 households by 1981. In 1985, the sample was significantly
re-organized. It was expanded to cover 66,642 households drawn from
846 counties, including some located in Tibet. The methodology was also
altered to provide more systematic measurement of income and expendi-
ture. Further significant changes occurred in 1990. In order to avoid the
problem of sample ageing, provision was made for the annual replace-
ment of a proportion of the households; by the late 1990s, this ensured
that the entire sample was replaced every four years. In addition, the
representation of the three large municipalities was increased as a pro-
portion of the total. Nevertheless, the overall size of the sample changed
little after the mid-1980s: for example, the 1998 rural survey included
68,300 households.3
Urban income surveys also ceased during the Cultural Revolution; the
last survey of which anything is known is for 1964, which sampled 3,537
households. Survey work began again in 1977–78, when a panel of
88,282 households was established, but it was not until 1980 that the
sample survey was fully restored, with 7,962 households covered. At-
tempts were made to ensure that these were drawn from county towns as
well as the great metropolitan centres and, as in rural China, selected
households were required to keep a record of their income and expendi-
ture. After 1985, when 24,338 households were included, the size of the
urban survey steadily rose. In 1989, it covered 27,795 households living
in cities and a further 7,440 in county towns, a total of 35,235.4 These
2. The SSB (Guojia tongjiju) has recently taken to calling itself the National Bureau of
Statistics; SSB is used throughout this article for consistency. The evolution of the SSB
surveys is traced in Yoshiro Matsuda, “Survey systems and sampling designs of Chinese
household surveys, 1952–1987,” The Developing Economies, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (September
1990), and Yue Wei, Dangdai Zhongguo de tongji shiye (China Today: Statistics) (Beijing:
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1990), pp. 543–554 and 555–574.
3. SSB, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1999 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing:
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999), p. 337. All Chinese Statistical Yearbooks are hereafter
abbreviated as ZGTJNJ.
4. SSB, 1989 Zhongguo chengzhen jumin jiating shouzhi diaocha ziliao (The Incomes
and Expenditure of China’s Urban Households in 1989) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 1990), pp. 67 and 73.
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figures again changed little during the 1990s: for example, the 1998
survey covered 39,080 households.
The degree of inequality of personal income identified by these surveys
is shown in Table 1. There are three main points to note. First, the gini
coefficients in the late 1970s were very low by international standards.5
This was especially true of the coefficients for the rural and urban sectors
considered separately. The overall gini coefficient was much higher than
either sectoral figure because of the substantial urban–rural income gap;
the main problem, as is well known, was the high level of subsidies paid
to urban residents. Nevertheless, the overall gini coefficient at the begin-
ning of the transition era was still modest by comparison with most
developing countries, and especially so when compared with the Latin
American norm of 0.5 or more. A second feature of Table 1 is that
income inequality rose substantially after 1978 in both urban areas and in
the countryside. In the early years of transition, the pace of increase was
most rapid in the rural sector (although it may have dipped slightly in
1982–83 at the height of decollectivization when land and other assets
were distributed on a per capita basis). For the period between 1978 and
1987, the rural gini increased by 8 percentage points whereas the urban
gini rose by only 4 points. By contrast, it was rising urban inequality
which dominated after 1987; rural inequality continued to rise, but not by
as much as urban inequality.6
Thirdly, the overall pace of inequality increase was much faster than
had been envisaged by the Party at the beginning of the transition period.
In 1979, Deng Xiaoping announced that the aim of China’s “four
modernizations” was to achieve a “comfortable” (xiaokang) standard of
living by 2000, a goal re-affirmed by successive CCP Congresses.7 The
standard of living was subsequently defined by the SSB in 1992 to
include 12 elements, ranging from the middle school enrolment rate to
income inequality.8 The xiaokang target for the latter was a gini
coefficient of 0.30 to 0.35. Separate targets were set for rural and urban
areas: 0.30 to 0.40 for the countryside, and 0.26 to 0.30 for urban China.9
The underlying logic was that a more equal distribution than the xiaokang
5. The gini coefficient is the most widely-used measure of income dispersion in the
literature. It ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1.
6. Using ordinary least squares to estimate growth rates for the transition era, the urban
gini rose by 4.3% per year (1978–96), the rural gini by 2.5% (1978–97) and the overall gini
by 2.3% (1980–96).
7. According to Deng: “The minimum target of our four modernizations is to achieve a
comparatively comfortable standard of living by the end of the century. I first mentioned this
with former prime minister Masayoshi Ohira of Japan during his visit here in December 1979”
(Deng Xiaoping, “Build socialism with Chinese characteristics,” in Central Committee,
Major Documents of the People’s Republic of China, December 1978–November 1989
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991), p. 3). For the re-affirmation of the target, see John
Wong, “Xiao-Kang: Deng Xiaoping’s socio-economic development target for China,” in
Wang Gungwu and John Wong (eds.), China’s Political Economy (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1998).
8. SSB, Zhongguo xiaokang biaozhun (China’s Xiaokang Standard) (Beijing: Zhongguo
tangji chubanshe, 1992).
9. Yin Shijie, Zhongguo xiaokang shuiping yanjiu (Research on China’s Xiaokang
Target) (Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1994), pp. 48–55.
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Table 1: State Statistical Bureau Estimates of Chinese Income
Inequality (gini coefficients)
Rural Urban Overall
1978 0.21 0.16 n/a
1979 n/a n/a n/a
1980 0.24 0.16 0.28
1981 0.24 0.16 n/a
1982 0.23 0.15 n/a
1983 0.25 0.15 n/a
1984 0.26 0.16 n/a
1985 0.26 0.19 n/a
1986 0.29 0.19 n/a
1987 0.29 0.20 n/a
1988 0.30 0.23 n/a
1989 0.30 0.23 n/a
1990 0.31 0.23 0.36
1991 0.31 0.24 n/a
1992 0.31 0.25 n/a
1993 0.32 0.27 0.38
1994 0.33 0.30 n/a
1995 0.34 0.28 0.41
1996 n/a 0.28 0.39
1997 0.33 n/a n/a
1998 0.33 n/a n/a
1999 0.35 n/a n/a
Sources:
Rural gini coefficients: 1978: Wang Chunzheng,
Woguo jumin shouru fenpei wenti (The Issue of Income
Distribution in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo jihua chuban-
she, 1995), p. 90; 1980–91: Zhang Ping, “Zhongguo
nongcun jumin quyujian shouru bupingdeng yu feinongji-
uye” (“Regional income inequality and non-agricultural
employment in rural China”), Jingji yanjiu (Economic
Research), No. 8 (August 1998), p. 60; 1992: Ma Hong
and Sun Shangqing, Zhongguo jingji xingshi yu zhan-
wang 1994–95 (China’s Economic Situation and
Prospects) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 1995),
p. 259; 1993 and 1994: SSB, Zhongguo nongcun tongji
nianjian 1995 (Chinese Rural Statistical Yearbook)
(Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996), p. 4; 1995:
Zhang Ping, “Regional income inequality,” p. 60. 1997
and 1998: by calculation from SSB, Zhongguo tongji
nianjian 1999 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing:
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999), p. 337; 1999: by
calculation from SSB at http://www.stats.gov.cn.
Urban gini coefficients: 1978–96: Wang Mengkui and
Lu Zhongyuan, Chengzhen jumin shouru chaju yanjiu
(Research on Urban Income Differentials) (Beijing:
Zhongguo yanshi chubanshe, 1997), p. 34.
Overall gini coefficients: 1980 and 1990: SSB, Zhong-
guo xiaokang biaozhun (China’s Xiaokang Standard)
(Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1992), p. 17, 1993,
1995 and 1996: Wang and Lu, Research, p. 186.
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target would be excessively egalitarian (and would therefore provide
inadequate work incentives), and that greater inequality would be incom-
patible with the Marxist idea of “distribution according to work done”
(and perhaps produce social tensions).10 By the late 1990s, the official
data in Table 1 suggest that China had successfully achieved its xiaokang
targets for the individual sectors; the urban gini had slipped to the upper
limit of its range in 1994 but it was back within it by 1996. However, the
overall gini – even though it had increased much less quickly than either
sectoral coefficient – was well above its target, standing at around 0.40 as
compared to the expected range of 0.30 to 0.35. These results together
imply that the urban–rural gap was not reduced as rapidly as hoped when
the xiaokang inequality targets were set.
The Limitations of the Early State Statistical Bureau Surveys
The inferences drawn in the previous paragraphs are based upon the
data collected in the annual SSB surveys. However, the quality of these
surveys during the early 1980s was exceptionally poor, and glaring
weaknesses remained even in the surveys of the mid and late 1990s.
One persistent problem has been geographical coverage. The 1978
rural survey covered only 20 provinces, and Qinghai and Tibet were
excluded until 1981 and 1984 respectively: the apparent increase in the
rural gini between 1978 and 1980 may simply reflect the inclusion of
“missing” provinces.11 The urban sample was similarly deficient. Even in
1989, when 35,235 urban households were surveyed, only 7,440 (21 per
cent) were drawn from county towns (zhen).12 Yet the 1990 Population
Census recorded a total urban population of 296.5 million, of whom 85.3
million lived in zhen (29 per cent).13 This suggests that the population of
China’s county towns was under-represented, a significant weakness
given its lower per capita income (1,106 yuan per annum as against 1,367
yuan); this weakness had not been remedied even in the late 1990s. The
geographical coverage of the 1989 urban sample was also odd in that only
500 households resident in Shanghai were included, whereas there were
1,000 Beijing households, 1,000 from Tianjin and (more remarkably) 830
from Gansu.14 Yet Shanghai’s urban population (zhen and shi combined)
was estimated at almost 9 million in the 1990 Census, comfortably
exceeding the urban populations of Beijing (8 million), Tianjin (6 mil-
10. The argument was re-stated by Zhao Ziyang in 1987 in his speech “Advance along the
road of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” in Central Committee, Major Documents, p.
668. He concluded that the income distribution at the time was still too equal: “The practice
of allowing everyone to ‘eat from the same big pot,’ egalitarianism and jealousy of other
people’s higher incomes still constitute the main tendency in income distribution at present.”
11. The provinces excluded in 1978, but included in 1980, were Guangxi, Jiangxi, Shaanxi,
Shanxi, Xinjiang and Zhejiang. Of these, only Zhejiang and Xinjiang (barely) registered per
capita income levels above the average. See SSB, ZGTJNJ 1991, p. 296.
12. SSB, 1989 Incomes and Expenditure, pp. 73 and 79.
13. Population Office, Major Figures of the Fourth National Population Census of China
(Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1991), p. 32.
14. These data include both households resident in cities, and households resident in county
towns. From SSB, 1989 Incomes and Expenditure, p. 79.
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lion) and Gansu (less than 5 million). This treatment of Gansu is
reflective of a more general tendency to over-represent China’s poorer
provinces in the household surveys for political reasons, and the net effect
on the income distribution is difficult to determine.15 Weighting proce-
dures can offset the impact of a small sample; one could give greater
weight to each Shanghai household in the overall sample, or choose
households from the upper end of the Shanghai distribution. But there is
no evidence that this was done, and it is plain that representing provinces
in the sample in proportion to their populations would be an altogether
more simple procedure.
A second problem with the SSB surveys has been occupational cover-
age. The rural surveys of the 1980s sampled only peasant households, and
thereby excluded rural households specializing in non-agricultural pro-
duction or dependent upon wage income earned outside agriculture.16
This was not much of a problem in the early 1980s when there were few
rural households wholly reliant upon the non-agricultural sector for their
income. Nevertheless, as the diversification of the rural economy pro-
ceeded, so the rural sample became less representative. The effect was
probably to understate inequality: many of the excluded households
received incomes which were either well above or well below the
average. A similar problem affected the urban surveys of the early 1980s.
These were restricted to staff and worker households, thereby excluding
self-employed and retired households. As with the rural survey, the effect
was probably to understate income inequality.
A third prominent weakness of the SSB surveys has been the use of a
narrow definition of income.17 Neither urban nor rural surveys attempted
to estimate the rental value of housing, even though most rural house-
holds owned their own house and urban households paid rent at below the
implicit market rate. In addition, the value of subsidies paid in cash and
in kind to urban households was greatly under-estimated, a particular
problem for the urban sector where subsidies accounted for over 80 per
cent of wages throughout the 1980s and 1990s.18 These subsidies in-
cluded cheap grain and vegetable oil, health, retirement, death, maternity
and disability benefits, childcare benefits, low rent housing, a commuting
subsidy, subsidized coal, and subsidized visits to distant relatives. The
income concept used in the rural surveys was problematic in another
respect: the valuation of self-consumed farm products at contract purchas-
15. The extent of over-representation was reduced after 1990, but it was not eliminated.
For example, there were some 50% more Jiangsu than Guizhou households in the 1996 rural
sample even though Jiangsu’s rural population (nongye renkou) was about 70% larger. From
Guizhou tongjiju (Guizhou Statistical Bureau), Guizhou tongji nianjian 1997 (Guizhou
Statistical Yearbook). (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1997), p. 121 and Jiangsu
tongjiju (Jiangsu Statistical Bureau), Jiangsu tongji nianjian 1997 (Jiangsu Statistical
Yearbook), (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1997), p. 91.
16. Matsuda, “Survey systems,” p. 342.
17. Griffin and Zhao, Distribution of Income, pp. 29–34.
18. Nicholas Lardy, “Consumption and living standards in China, 1978–1983,” The China
Quarterly, No. 100 (December 1984), pp. 853–56. Ma Hong, Modern China’s Economy and
Management (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1990), pp. 453–59. See also Table 3, below.
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ing prices. In the case of grain, the contract price was below the market
price and therefore the incomes of poor peasants was understated – thus
exaggerating the extent of inequality.19 But in some cases, such as milk,
the contract price was arguably too high and therefore the income of
herdsmen was exaggerated in the surveys. The net effect cannot be
judged. The “true” price of self-consumed milk for the purpose of
determining the income of herdsmen ought to be the price herdsmen
would have been willing to pay given a “free” choice. However, there is
self-evidently no way of establishing that in unambiguous fashion. But
the probable understatement in the surveys of the price of grain, the most
important self-consumed food product, had the effect of increasing
income inequality because it undervalued the incomes of (predominantly
poor) households who marketed only a small proportion of their pro-
duction.20
New Estimates of Income Inequality
These flaws in the SSB surveys were well-known by the mid-1980s,
and attempts to improve them proceeded along two lines. First, the SSB
itself did much to improve the sampling. The occupational coverage of
the urban sample was expanded in 1985 to include the self-employed and
retired households; the name of the survey was even altered – from
zhigong jiating (staff and worker households) to chengzhen jumin jiating
(urban resident households) – to signal this change. A comparison of the
1984 and 1985 data shows that the effect of expanded occupational
coverage was to increase urban inequality. For example, 5.1 per cent of
households received less than 25 yuan per capita per month in 1985
compared to only 1.7 per cent in 1984, a change that can be explained
only in terms of an alteration in sampling design.21
The coverage of the rural sample also expanded in the mid-1980s. By
1984, every province was included, and in the following year the size of
the sample was raised from 31,375 to 66,642 households. In 1994, it was
finally acknowledged that there were too many rural households entirely
detached from agriculture to justify their exclusion any longer: the
nongmin jiating (peasant household) survey thus became the survey of
rural resident households (nongcun jumin jiating).
These changes have undoubtedly improved the quality of the house-
hold income surveys, and have persuaded some scholars that SSB gini
coefficients for the late 1980s and 1990s can be trusted.22 However, there
19. See, for example, World Bank, China: Strategies for Reducing Poverty in the 1990s
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1992), pp. 22–24.
20. An additional ongoing problem with the sampling procedure is that no provision is
made for the impact of inflation or deflation on per capita incomes when altering the
composition of the sample. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this point.
21. SSB, ZGTJNJ 1987, p. 691.
22. For example, Yang has argued that “the Household Surveys provide appropriate (and
perhaps the best) data” (Yang, “Urban-biased policies,” p. 307). The SSB data have also been
viewed as reliable enough for decomposition analysis designed to identify the sources of rising
inequality; see Tsui, “Factor decomposition” and Yao Shujie, “Economic growth, income
696 The China Quarterly
are good reasons for remaining sceptical. Several Chinese institutions
have conducted surveys of their own, and come up with estimates of
inequality which are substantially greater than the SSB figures. For
example, a survey conducted in late 1984 and early 1985 by the Rural
Policy Research Unit of the CCP and the Rural Development Research
Centre of the State Council put the rural gini coefficient for 1984 at 0.40,
far above the SSB figure of 0.26.23 A decade later, a survey by the Social
Survey Centre at the People’s University of China put the urban gini at
0.37, again well above the SSB figure for 1994.24
In the West, meanwhile, an attempt was made in the mid-1980s to
adjust the SSB estimate of inequality to incorporate the impact of urban
subsidies on the urban–rural income differential.25 More recently, the
World Bank has tried to revise the SSB data but, without access to the
raw household data, its work has relied of necessity upon ad hoc
revisions.26
The most systematic re-appraisal of the SSB data was begun by a team
of Chinese and Western researchers in the late 1980s, and the results of
this work began to appear in print in 1992.27 The team took a subset of
the SSB data for 1988 (and later for 1995), and adjusted the income
estimates to correct three perceived weaknesses. First, the imputed rental
value of housing was included in income. Secondly, the range of subsi-
dies included in income was widened. Thirdly, self-consumed farm
products were re-valued at market prices. One result of these adjustments
was to raise household per capita income; the Khan and Riskin figure for
the average rural resident in 1988 was 564 yuan, compared to 453 yuan
in the original SSB survey; the inclusion of housing rental value alone
contributed 73 yuan of this difference. In the urban sector, the inclusion
of a wider range of subsidies raised per capita income by no less than 20
per cent.28 The divergence between the rural SSB and the revised sample
footnote continued
inequality and poverty in China under economic reform,” Journal of Development Studies,
Vol. 35, No. 6 (August 1999).
23. Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu nongcun zhengce yanjiushi ziliaoshi (Rural Policy
Research Office of the Secretariat of the Central Committee), Zhongguo nongcun shehui jingji
dianxing diaocha (A Typical Example Survey of China’s Rural Economy and Society)
(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1988). The details of this survey, which was
biased towards higher income areas, are discussed in Chris Bramall and Marion E. Jones,
“Rural income inequality in China since 1978.” Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1
(October 1993).
24. Wang and Lu, Research, p. 4.
25. Adelman and Sunding, “Economic policy and income distribution.”
26. The Bank adjusted urban incomes to allow for subsidies, but at the same time reduced
(relative) urban income by assuming that the cost of living was 15% higher in the cities. See
World Bank, Sharing, p. 17. The often-cited World Bank estimate of inequality in the early
1980s did little more than replicate the official SSB gini; the figure cited for 1981 of 0.29
(World Bank, Sharing, p. 1) for the overall gini is virtually identical to the official figure of
0.28 for 1980 (Table 1, above).
27. Khan et al., “Household income”; Griffin and Zhao, Distribution of Income; Khan and
Riskin, “Income and inequality”; Li, Zhao and Zhang, “Economic transition” and Li and Zhao,
“Income distribution revisited.” Details of the survey questions asked in 1988 and 1995 can
be found in Li, Zhao and Riskin, Income Distribution Revisited, pp. 630–697.
28. Griffin and Zhao, Distribution of Income, pp. 33 and 35.
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Table 2: Alternative Estimates of the Chinese Income Distribution,
1978–1995
Rural Gini Urban Gini Overall Gini
1978 0.22 0.17 0.32
1988 0.34 0.23 0.38
1990 – – 0.41
1995 0.42 0.33 0.45
Sources:
1978: Irma Adelman and David Sunding, “Economic policy and income
distribution in China,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3
(September 1987), p. 163; 1988: Keith Griffin and Zhao Renwei (eds.),
The Distribution of Income in China (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 61;
1990: World Bank, Sharing Rising Incomes (Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 1997), p. 17; 1995: Azizur Rahman Khan and Carl Riskin, “Income
and inequality in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 154 (June 1998), pp.
237, 242 and 247.
was even greater in percentage terms in 1995, but was smaller for the
revised urban sample, mainly because subsidies had declined in
significance between 1988 and 1995.29
The revised estimates of inequality made by Adelman and Sunding, the
World Bank, and Khan and Riskin have one thing in common: they have
all generated much higher gini coefficients than those computed by the
SSB and given in Table 1. These new estimates are summarized in Table
2. For example, the World Bank estimate for 1990 is 5 percentage points
higher than the official estimate. The story is largely the same for 1995:
the Khan and Riskin estimate for that year is 4 percentage points higher
than the SSB gini. This increase occurs because the sources of income
omitted in the SSB surveys were much more unequally distributed than
those types of income which were included.
The result of these revisions is clear. Although they confirm the
upward trend apparent in the official data, they also suggest that the
distribution of personal income has become more unequal than suggested
by the SSB surveys; this conclusion holds at both a sectoral and national
level. But just how reliable are these new figures?
The Limitations of the Revised Inequality Data
The work undertaken by Khan, Riskin and others has undoubtedly
produced better estimates of income inequality.30 Nevertheless, these
29. Khan and Riskin, “Income and inequality,” pp. 230–33.
30. In two respects, the revised data are actually inferior to the SSB figures. First, the
revised urban sample includes an even smaller proportion of households living in county
towns; for example, no county towns were included in the Liaoning urban sample. See Khan
et al., “Household income,” p. 1030 fn or Griffin and Zhao, Distribution of Income, p. 333.
Secondly, the number of provinces and cities covered in the sub-sample is much lower than
in the SSB sample; for example, the Khan and Riskin sub-sample for 1995 excludes
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revised estimates remain seriously deficient, largely because they are still
based on the data collected by the SSB. Some of the deficiencies produce
a continuing under-estimation of true income inequality; these will be
discussed first. But in other respects the revised inequality data may
overstate true inequality, and these opposing biases are discussed at the
end of this section.
To begin with those factors which lead to an under-estimation of
inequality: one continuing problem is the requirement that households
included in either the rural or urban survey keep a record of their income
and expenditure. In practice, this has meant that illiterate households have
been excluded. Although the SSB has instructed local statistical assistants
to help selected illiterate households in record collection, it is likely that
they have simply been omitted from the surveys.31 Given that illiteracy is
still common (the 1997 One Percent Population Survey found that 10 per
cent of males and 23 per cent of females aged 15 and over were illiterate)
and that there is a strong correlation between illiteracy and low income,
the effect is that the surveys understate inequality by excluding a
significant proportion of the poor.
A second problem is the estimate of income from savings, and what
this estimate implies about the coverage of the urban sample. The Khan
and Riskin estimates for urban income in 1995 have property income
contributing 72 yuan out of total per capita income of 5,706 yuan; rural
property income was estimated to be 10 yuan. However, the aggregate
savings data suggest that these estimates are too low. In 1995, total
savings were 813 billion yuan. Of these, 108 billion yuan is attributable
to the re-investment of interest payments. Of the remainder, 78 billion
yuan were public funds deposited in the names of private individuals
(gongkuan sicun). This leaves total household savings of 627 billion yuan
(including 147 billion yuan saved by private entrepreneurs), implying that
89 per cent of savings are made by the household sector.32 If we apply
this percentage to total accumulated savings in 1995 (2,966 billion yuan,
or 2,449 yuan per capita),33 we come to a figure of 2,180 yuan per capita
for the total accumulated value of personal savings. Assuming (very
conservatively) an interest rate of 5 per cent, the result is a per capita
income from savings (rural and urban sectors combined) of 109 yuan.
This is well above even the Khan and Riskin estimate for urban savings
(which was undoubtedly much higher than the combined rural–urban
total).
The most plausible reason for this big discrepancy is that the SSB data
used by Khan and Riskin under-sample (and perhaps even exclude) high
saving private sector entrepreneurs (siying jingyingzhe). This group con-
footnote continued
Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Ningxia, Guangxi, Fujian, Hainan, Tianjin and
Shanghai for reasons of cost.
31. World Bank, Strategies, p. 154.
32. Wang and Lu, Research, p. 209. These data come from surveys jointly conducted by
the SSB and the People’s Bank of China.
33. SSB, ZGTJNJ 1998, p. 324.
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tributed 147 billion yuan of household savings in 1995.34 Moreover,
because the high savings made by excluded entrepreneurial households
reflect their high incomes,35 their inclusion in the urban survey would
necessarily raise the urban gini coefficient. One estimate suggests this
would raise the urban gini to about 0.31 in 1995–96 – even before the
revisions made by Khan and Riskin.36 An even more drastic revision to
the SSB data (this time for 1988) raises the rural gini to 0.37 and the
urban gini to 0.27; this revision is based on an attempt to include a range
of illegal income (feifa shouru).37 Of course the incomes of the rich are
routinely under-reported in all countries, but it should be remembered
that a “capitalist” class did not exist in China in 1978 whereas it never
disappeared in most countries. The re-appearance of this class after 1978
therefore constitutes a real increase in income inequality when China is
compared with other countries.
A third problem is the exclusion from the urban sample of those living
in urban areas without a formal certificate of residence (hukou). It is hard
to be sure about the size of the floating population because of inconsisten-
cies in the definition of urban, and in the definition of floaters.38 Many
estimates of urban floaters seem to refer only to cities; however, “urban”
as defined by the urban income survey includes both county towns and
cities. Using this definition, it is reasonable to argue that all the floaters
live in urban areas. If true, this puts the urban floating population at
around 80 million by the mid-1990s.39 Be that as it may, the omission of
the floating population is significant only because its average per capita
income is below the urban average. A survey of 2,900 floaters in four
34. Wang and Lu, Research, p. 209.
35. 43% of urban savings in 1996 were held by the richest 20% of income earners, and
the richest 3.5% of households held 16% of savings (ibid. p. 210).
36. Ibid. p. 196. There is much anecdotal evidence which points to a large number of very
rich people living in urban China by the mid-1990s. One source put the number of households
receiving more than 50,000 yuan per capita in 1998 at 5.3 million (South China Morning Post,
3 August 1998). Another estimated that there were 3 million millionaires in China in 1996
(Tong Xing, trans. in FBIS-CHI-96-069).
37. Chen Zongsheng, Jingji fazhan zhong de shouru fenpei (The Distribution of Income
during Economic Development) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994), pp. 274–78.
38. This term, as well as floaters, is used hereafter to refer to both the “temporary
population” (zhanju renkou) of urban areas (which was recorded in the population censuses
of 1982 and 1990) and to those whose presence went unrecorded. Migrant (qianyi) is
misleading because official Chinese sources use it to refer to those who have permanently
changed their hukou.
39. A variety of estimates of the floating population are given in Dorothy Solinger,
Contesting Citizenship in Urban China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp.
19–21. Some estimates by Chinese scholars include Shen Yimin and Tong Chengzhu,
Zhongguo renkou qianyi (Population Migration in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 1992); Li Rongshi, “Dui dangqian woguo liudong renkou de renshi he sikao”
(“Reflections on China’s current floating population”), Renkou yanjiu (Population Research),
Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 1996); Li Rongshi, “Dui dangqian woguo nongcun renkou liudong
de zai renshi” (“A reconsideration of China’s current rural floating population”), Renkou
yanjiu, Vol. 20, No. 6 (November 1996). For recent English-language studies, see Leila
Fernandez-Stembridge and Taciana Fisac, “An overview of today’s rural–urban migration
flows in the People’s Republic of China,” in Werner Draguhn and Robert Ash, China’s
Economic Security (London: Curzon Press, 1999); Wang Fei-Ling, From Family to Market
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); and Sarah Cook and Margaret Maurer-Fazio, The
Workers’ State Meets the Market (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
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cities for 1995, for example, found that average floater earnings were
only 80 per cent of the earnings of residents.40 This was mainly because
of occupational segmentation: the floating population were principally
employed in low wage jobs. This in turn partially reflected the attitude of
municipal governments. In Beijing, for example, a list of 198 types of
permitted work was published in February 1998: this pushed floaters into
unpopular and low paid jobs such as abattoir work, burning corpses and
mining.41 In the same month, “the authorities decreed that all migrants
employed as postal workers, machinists, gardeners and street sweepers
must be fired immediately and replaced with jobless Beijingers within 20
days” (South China Morning Post, 10 February 1998). The measure
affected 120,000 floaters. Similarly, the Deputy Party Secretary of Liaon-
ing openly encouraged unemployed workers to “grab back” the jobs held
by floaters.42 The exclusion of the floating population from the urban
household survey therefore produces a further under-statement of urban
inequality and the need to expand the sample has been recognized by the
SSB.43
The factors causing an under-estimation of inequality are counter-bal-
anced by other factors which cause the opposite bias. First, consider the
impact of the exclusion of floaters from the urban survey. One effect of
their exclusion is an under-estimation of the urban gini coefficient; many
were employed in low wage jobs, and their disposable income was even
lower because many had to pay an urban residence fee.44 However, the
impact of (illegal) migration is also to depress the average urban wage
and increase the average rural wage, the net effect being a narrowing of
the urban–rural income differential.45 This is one of the reasons why the
World Bank has advocated the removal of residual controls on migration
in the 1990s. If the floating population were to be included in the urban
survey, the overall effect would therefore be ambiguous. On the one
hand, it would raise the intra-urban gini coefficient and therefore in-
creases the overall gini coefficient. On the other hand, it would narrow
the income gap between urban and rural China, thereby reducing the
40. John Knight, Song Lina and Jia Huaibin, “Chinese rural migrants in urban enterprises,”
in Cook and Maurer-Fazio, Workers’ State, p. 84. A larger study of 7,973 households drawn
from across China found that “outsiders” earned only 54% of the “insider” wage in Beijing
in 1995. However, the ratio was much higher in Guangdong (85%) and in two provinces
(Shandong and Jiangsu) outsiders earned more than insiders; see Li Shi, “Zhongguo nongcun
laodongli liudong yu shouru zengzhang he fenpei” (“The migration of rural labour in China
and its income growth and distribution”), Zhongguo shehui kexue (Social Sciences in China),
No. 2 (March 1999), p. 20. These figures may be misleading in that they probably include
permanent migrants as well as floaters.
41. SCMP, 17 April 1998.
42. SCMP, 15 October 1997.
43. The SSB embarked upon a programme of collaboration with the World Bank in
1999–2000 to widen the urban sample frame to include migrants.
44. The way this fee system operated in Beijing in the mid-1990s is discussed in Michael
Dutton, Streetlife China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
45. Technically, this conclusion rests upon the assumptions that the urban wage exceeds
subsistence and that the labour supply curve is upward-sloping. Otherwise, the post-migration
wage will not change. Both assumptions seem plausible for urban China, although lay-offs
from state-owned enterprises made the labour supply curve more flat during the late 1990s.
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Table 3: Subsidies Paid to Urban Residents, 1990 and 1995 (yuan per
capita, current prices)
1990 1995
Income 1,629 4,612
Subsidies 1,280 3,304
Of which:
Housing 730 1,960
Old age insurance 101 595
Health 119 306
Education 129 252
Transport 3 14
Prices 121 59
Subsidies in kind (wupin) 45 87
Other subsidies 18 31
Source:
Wang and Lu, Research, pp. 203–204. The 1995 data are also
re-produced in World Bank, Sharing, p. 19.
overall gini coefficient.46 Migration is therefore no simple panacea for the
problem of income inequality.
A second reason why the revised surveys of income inequality may
over-state inequality concerns the subsidies paid to urban workers. The
SSB urban income surveys exclude almost all subsidies except pensions
(which are included under transfer income).47 This transfer income was
valued at 740 yuan in the SSB survey for 1995. Khan and Riskin expand
the subsidy category further to include housing and other net subsidies,
which they value at an additional 626 yuan, thus bringing the revised per
capita subsidy total to 1,366 yuan.48 Even so, this revised accounting still
vastly under-states the true value of urban subsidies. According to a more
detailed SSB calculation, in addition to an income of 1,629 yuan per
capita, each urban citizen received a fuli shouru (subsidy income) of
1,280 yuan in 1990. The corresponding figures for 1995 were 4,612 and
3,304 yuan respectively, and this latter figure is clearly far greater than
the Khan and Riskin estimate of subsidy income. The scale of the
subsidies paid to the urban population is outlined in Table 3.
The point about subsidies is not merely that they are larger than
suggested by Khan and Riskin, but that they serve to make the urban
46. A recent World Bank study (Sharing, p. 53) argues that the net effect is positive:
“Migration alleviates the pronounced inequality between poor rural people and wealthy
urbanites and helps redistribute rural incomes because migrants send significant portions of
their earnings back to their families. Although migration may be increasing inequality among
urban residents, national inequality would likely be more severe in the absence of migration.”
47. See SSB, ZGTJNJ 1995, p. 262. The category zhuanyixing shouru is translated as
“transfer income” in ZGTJNJ 1999 but as “pensions, subsidies, donations and other” in the
1995 edition.
48. Khan and Riskin, “Income and inequality,” p. 229.
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distribution of income much more equal.49 This is because the poorest
urban households receive disproportionately more in subsidies than do
the richest households. In 1995, for example, the per capita subsidy
received by the poorest 10 per cent of households was 2,076 yuan, which
was 17 per cent greater than their income. By contrast, the subsidies
received by the richest 10 per cent of households amounted to much more
in cash terms (3,882 yuan) but to only 38 per cent of their income. The
effect, therefore, of including the full value of subsidies in estimating the
urban income distribution is greatly to reduce urban inequality. Accord-
ing to one set of estimates, the 1995 urban gini of 0.28 (the SSB estimate)
falls to only 0.21 once subsidies are included.50 This, of course, does not
mean that urban inequality was unchanging in the 1990s. The post-sub-
sidy urban gini shows a rise from 0.16 in 1990 to 0.21 in 1995; this
increase is actually greater than the increase in the pre-subsidy urban gini.
The reason is that subsidies as a percentage of income became less
generous over the course of the 1990s (falling from 78 per cent of income
in 1990 to 72 per cent in 1995) and in this process the subsidies paid to
the poor fell more quickly than those paid to the rich.51 For example, the
subsidy income received by the bottom 10 per cent increased by 109 per
cent but that of the richest 10 per cent rose by 141 per cent. Nevertheless
with the bottom decile receiving subsidies valued at 117 per cent of their
income and the top decile receiving subsidies of only 38 per cent, the net
impact of subsidies were still clearly re-distributive.
A final problem arises because the survey-derived personal income
data are at current prices. In principle, aggregation problems arise here
because of regional price differences; an income of 1,000 yuan might
translate into significantly less purchasing power in Beijing than in
Guizhou. This posed few difficulties at the beginning of the transition
period when most prices were set by the state in such a way as to
minimize regional differences. In 1952, before the introduction of the
state-controlled system of grain procurement, large inter-provincial price
differences were the norm. For example, the price paid for wheat in
Yunnan was 50 per cent below the national average. By 1965, however,
the wheat prices had been equalized and in 1978 the Yunnan price was
actually slightly higher.52 The same pattern of growing equalization is
clear for other agricultural commodities and for other provinces. By the
mid-1990s, however, significant regional price differences had re-
emerged. This is apparent from the different urban poverty lines intro-
duced in China’s cities during the 1990s. Those introduced in the summer
of 1996, for instance, drew the poverty line at 120 yuan per month in
49. The new system of personal income taxation introduced in January 1994 has the same
effect because of its progressive nature; for example, the first 800 yuan of monthly income
is exempt from tax and the marginal tax rate on incomes over 50,000 yuan per month is 100%.
It is not yet clear, however, how much evasion takes place.
50. Wang and Lu, Research, p. 179.
51. The ratio of subsidies to income fell from 138 to 117% for the poorest 10% of
households between 1990 and 1995, and from 50 to 38% for the richest 10% of households
(ibid. p. 205).
52. Zhonggong Yunnan sheng wei zhengce yanjiushi (Policy Research Unit of the Yunnan
Party Committee), Yunnan sheng qing (Conditions in Yunnan), (Kunming: Yunnan renmin
chubanshe, 1986), p. 1026.
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Chongqing, Shijiazhuang, Hefei and Jinan but at 150 yuan in Ningbo and
170 yuan in Beijing. In Shanghai, the poverty line was set at 185 yuan as
early as 1993, and was 200 yuan in Guangzhou in mid-1995.53
However, it is not easy to judge the impact of these price differences
on the distribution of income. One study, using provincial-level cost of
living indices to re-value income, found that inequality as measured by
the Theil coefficient fell from 0.32 to 0.28 in 1990 after price adjust-
ment.54 But there can be no easy presumption that inequality in general
would be lower after these sorts of adjustments. For one thing, a great
deal of data are needed because of large intra-provincial variations in the
cost of living. For example, current price gross agricultural output
(GVAO) in Jinniu, a suburb of Chengdu, was 2.14 times its constant
(1990) price valuation in 1996 but the ratio in Zhaojue (one of the poorest
counties in Sichuan) was only 1.34 to 1. Secondly, there was no clear
relationship between high prices and high levels of nominal income. To
give an illustration, the gini coefficient for nominal GDP per head in
Sichuan’s counties and cities in 1996 was 0.31. But if one adjusts GDP
in every county for varying ratios of current to constant price GVAO –
in other words, if it is assumed that every county had the same inflation
rate between 1990 and 1996 – the gini coefficient is virtually unchanged
at 0.30.55 This is of course a very ad hoc adjustment; ideally one would
use retail price data for each county. But it does illustrate the general
point that high nominal GDP and/or proximity to the provincial capital
did not of itself guarantee a high inflation rate. Moreover, the use of
official poverty lines does not really help. This is because the setting of
the threshold was influenced by the generosity of local government as
well as by its assessment of “objective” need. In short, it is virtually
impossible to determine the impact of regional price differences on the
distribution of income. For that very reason, one should be cautious about
making definitive pronouncements on the trajectory of inequality after
1978.
Conclusion
There is surely little doubt that income inequality has spiralled in
China since 1978. The official SSB data show an increase in the gini
coefficient from about 0.3 to around 0.4 between 1978 and 1996. The
adjustments made by Khan and Riskin point towards a steeper rate of
increase, the gini reaching a level of nearer to 0.45 by the mid-1990s.
And there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence pointing to the same
conclusion. It is hard to conceive of any adjustments to the household
income surveys which would reverse this conclusion.
For policy purposes, however, it is necessary to know why inequality
53. Wang and Lu, Research, p. 226.
54. Ravallion and Chen 1997, cited in World Bank, Sharing, p. 18.
55. The Sichuan data come from Sichuan tongjiju (Sichuan Statistical Bureau), Sichuan
tongji nianjian 1997 (Sichuan Statistical Yearbook), (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe,
1997).
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rose.56 If the major cause is spatial, the policy solution might be to
remove residual restrictions on labour mobility. Alternatively, the Chi-
nese state could seek to re-distribute income, using a combination of
taxes and subsidies, from rich areas (mainly the cities and rural eastern
China) to the hinterland. But if inequality has risen because of growing
differentials within the cities and the countryside, an altogether different
raft of policies would have to be adopted; these might centre on the
development of a much more progressive system of income taxation.
Unfortunately the existing survey data, even as adjusted in recent years
by Chinese and Western researchers, are simply not good enough to show
why inequality has risen. Inequality can be thought of as being deter-
mined by three factors: inequality within rural areas, inequality within
urban areas, and the urban–rural income gap. In the rural sector, the
exclusion of many illiterate households at the bottom end of the income
scale, and private sector entrepreneurs at the top, means that even the
revised rural gini coefficients understate true rural inequality. Assessing
the true degree of urban inequality is still more difficult. This is mainly
because even the revised data exclude the majority of private en-
trepreneurs,57 the floating population, illiterate households and a
significant proportion of urban subsidies; they also take no account of
regional price differences in the cost of living. Of these weaknesses, the
exclusion of the first three leads to an understatement of true urban
inequality. However, the exclusion of many subsidies, the last category,
leads to an overstatement. Furthermore, none of these categories has
remained time-invariant: the impact of the various biases has changed
over time as the number of illiterates has fallen and the number of private
sector entrepreneurs has increased. The net impact can only be guessed.
As for the urban–rural income differential (which, along with the
sectoral coefficients, determines the overall gini coefficient), it is again
hard to be certain of its size: all the continuing flaws in even the revised
assessments of income in urban and rural China necessarily show up in
estimates of the urban–rural gap. Moreover, the biases run in both
directions, especially for urban per capita income. If the floating popu-
lation living in urban areas but not covered by the urban surveys were
included, the urban–rural gap would be reduced because their inclusion
would depress urban wages and raise rural incomes (via remittances). But
against this, if the large subsidies paid to urban residents were accurately
measured, the absolute urban–rural gap would be even wider. The size of
the gap has probably narrowed since 1978 – if anything, subsidies as a
percentage of urban income have fallen and migration has depressed
56. Although it is fair to say that there was a general perception in China by the mid-1990s
that spatial inequality had increased beyond acceptable bounds. It was this perception that
influenced policy formulation, in particular the introduction of a range of programmes (such
as the creation of a Western Region Development Office) designed to raise incomes in rural
western China, as much as any “objective” reality. I am indebted to a referee for this
observation.
57. This problem is much greater in the urban than in the rural sector simply because the
vast majority of high income private entrepreneurs live in urban areas.
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urban wages – but it is impossible to tell by how much from the data
generated by the urban and rural household surveys.
In sum, one needs to be aware of the fragile foundation on which any
pronouncements about the reasons for the surge in Chinese income
inequality are based. To rely too heavily for policy purposes on the
findings of decomposition analysis in these circumstances appears ill-ad-
vised.58 Better data are needed first.
58. A case in point is the tendency of Khan and others to use their revisions to the SSB
data for 1988 and 1995 far too uncritically in order to delineate and explain the persistence
of rural poverty. See Azizur Rahman Khan, Poverty in China in the Period of Globalization
(Geneva: ILO discussion paper No. 22, 1998), and UNDP/ILO, “Policies for poverty
reduction in China” (unpublished UNDP ms., February 2000).
